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To record and bring attention to the
early years of operations research analysis
and the Military Operations Research Soci-
ety (MORS), the MORS Board of Directors
created a Heritage Committee in 1992. The
Heritage Committee uses two main meth-
ods for disseminating the history of opera-
tions research analysis. One is to conduct a
Heritage Session at the yearly MORS Sym-
posium; the second method is to publish
oral histories provided by prominent
MORS members. This document contains
the oral history of one of the most distin-
guished members of MORS: Wayne Philo
Hughes, Jr. Wayne Hughes is currently the
Dean of the Graduate School of Opera-
tional and Information Sciences at the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in
Monterey, California. The purpose of the
interview was to gain insight into Dean
Hughes’ background, his motivation for
studying Operations Research analysis, his
early experiences in operations analysis,
and his ideas regarding the development
and future direction of MORS. The inter-
view was conducted in three sessions: 31
March 2003 at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, and 9 June
2003 and 11 June 2003 at United States Ma-
rine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Today is
Monday the 31st of March 2003. It is 15:30
and I am in the office of Wayne P. Hughes,
Jr., Dean of the Graduate School of Opera-
tional and Information Sciences, at the Na-
val Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cali-
fornia. Sir, I’d like to start with some basic
questions about your background. Where
were you born and raised?
WAYNE HUGHES: I was born in
Charleston, Illinois, on 30 May 1930. I grew
up in the Midwest and fell in love with the
sea by reading stories. Most great naval
officers came from inland states, from indi-
viduals like Nimitz who came from Texas,
Arleigh Burke who came from Colorado,
and Ernie King who came from Ohio. I
guess if you live too close to the sea, then
you know better than to go to sea. But if
you come from the Midwest you have this
romantic view of the Navy. Well, I went off
to the Naval Academy in 1948 right out of
high school (Hirsch High School, Chicago
IL 1944–1948), graduated from USNA in
1952, and started my career in destroyers.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did your par-
ents influence this naval career choice?
WAYNE HUGHES: Well, I’m a junior.
My mother’s name was Nancy Gay Case.
She came from Indiana and my father came
from Ohio, so we truly were Midwestern-
ers. And, no, they didn’t have any inkling
that I had this love of the sea. I come from
a big family of teachers. Actually, there
were lots of teachers throughout my
family.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: I assume they
must have given you some terrific insight
into your teaching career very early.
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, indeed they
did.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Any brothers
and sisters?
WAYNE HUGHES: I’m an only child.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Tell us about
your early schooling.
WAYNE HUGHES: Most relevant to
these discussions, when I was in high
school, I liked mathematics and geometry.
When I went off to the Naval Academy, I
found I preferred naval history, foreign
policy, and literature, and so I already lived
in this world of great tension between what
we consider the hard and soft sciences.
I went to the Naval Postgraduate
School from 1962 to 1964 ten years later; I
was right back into the mathematical and
analytical side of things. So I have lived
with a foot in both camps—I guess I’m a
dilettante. I like everything, but that means
I can’t be very deep at anything. The same
thing is true of having one foot in the Navy
and one foot in the analytical community. It
is like having one foot in broad and inter-
disciplinary kinds of studies and the other
foot in knowledge like most academics
have to have, with a lot of depth in some
particular field.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was there
anything in high school that led you down
this path?
WAYNE HUGHES: In a few words, it
was dumb luck. In my senior year of high
school I was going to Purdue University
because my mother went there. About half-
way through my family got to talking
about the Naval Academy with a neighbor.
I mentioned that I’d really like to go to the
Naval Academy, but I thought it was be-
yond my reach, and he said, “Oh, I’ll get ya’
a nomination.” He didn’t actually help a
bit, but he got me working on it myself, and
with a little luck I got in with a Congres-
sional appointment in the fall of 1948.
MIKE GARRAMBONE:What did you
study at the Naval Academy?
WAYNE HUGHES: Everybody stud-
ied the same thing then. The only choice
one had when I went to the Naval Acad-
emy was language. It was common curric-
ulum for everyone then. I came back in
1957 to 1960 and participated in a curricu-
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lum revolution in which we broke free from
this rigid system. The first thing we did was
allow validation of previous studies and that
meant that electives were now possible and that
led to different year groups going to class to-
gether, which meant you couldn’t march to
class anymore. This one idea—validation—
broke an enormous logjam. At the same time
we stiffened the courses, especially in science
and engineering, to more of a college curricu-
lum. When I went there, the Naval Academy
was an awful lot like a late nineteenth century
academy.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How so?
WAYNE HUGHES: It was like a high
school level academy where you study, recite,
and make sure you knew your lesson, but it
didn’t particularly emphasize whether you had
absorbed the material beyond the next day’s
recitation. It imbued knowledge more than it
imbued the capacity to reason. Education has to
teach how to think and understand multifac-
eted problems.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was it more like
an engineering school?
WAYNEHUGHES:After the change it was
closer to an engineering school, a very good
engineering school. Before the change I would
say the intent was that it be an engineering
school, but engineering characterized as design
of boilers and turbines. After the change there
was an understanding of thermodynamics,
fluid mechanics, and more of the courses that a
college undergraduate would take. For in-
stance, in my Plebe year, one of the courses that
we took was drafting—mechanical drawing we
called it. It was an extraordinary course, and
one of the subjects I did very best at, but it was
obsolete in a college environment.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: In my own
thoughts I relate to you as a grand teacher of
tacticians. Can you tell me what tactics was like
at the academy then? Were there any similari-
ties with the teaching of tactics of today?
WAYNE HUGHES: The tactics then were
kind of “hands-on” tactics. We went out in a
small patrol craft called YPs (yard patrols),
which were just big enough that a dozen mid-
shipmen could man them. We could maneuver
up and down the Severn River and try different
formations using the signal book and radiotele-
phone procedures. We did have a CIC drill
because we had some very good CIC mockups
that were installed during World War II. CIC
stands for the Combat Information Center, the
combat direction center where we fight our
ships.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Were these pow-
ered or sail?
WAYNE HUGHES: The YPs were diesel
engine powered. The CIC was ashore in Luce
Hall. We also memorized things like the signal
flags, and flashing light Morse Code. We
learned in Naval Ordnance and Gunnery how a
fire control computer worked, the old mechan-
ical computers that used analog systems of
cams instead of digital type computers.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: System of cams?
WAYNE HUGHES: Cams that were
shaped like integrals and stuff like that.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: That’s a different
form of tactical stuff.
WAYNE HUGHES: The closest we came to
a course in tactics per se was in the naval his-
tory course. The civilians liked to emphasize
the strategy and policy aspects more than tac-
tics in naval history. I went back to USNA to
teach naval history and played a small role in
the big curriculum revolution that took place
from 1957 to 1960. I taught naval history then
while I was working in the Superintendent’s
office.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You must have
had some interesting students.
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, in fact there were
a couple who later became flag officers. But
keep in mind, not all my students were going to
become members of the Operations Research
community.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Could you men-
tion some of your early mentors?
WAYNE HUGHES: After I graduated, an
early mentor who was very instrumental in my
taking Operations Research was Commander
Leslie L. Youngblood. He was the executive
officer of my first ship, the USS Cushing
(DD797). He had worked with Forrest Sherman
when they were both on the Battleship Mis-
souri. He told me that the up and coming grad-
uate education to take was a new curriculum
being started at the Naval Postgraduate School.
This was in 1953 and Les Youngblood said the
only curriculum a line officer ought to consider
was the Operations Analysis curriculum.
Youngblood was a Rhodes scholar, an intellec-
tual, and the guy who first showed me that
there was more to being a naval officer than
being an officer of the deck, a division officer,
and a navigator. I took note, because I was a
navigator on my first ship.
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MIKE GARRAMBONE: What ship was
that?
WAYNE HUGHES: It was the USS Cush-
ing. It was about the fourth USS Cushing, DD
797. The ship was named after the destroyer
that was sunk at the first night battle of Guadal-
canal and I still occasionally go to Cushing
reunions in which my ship’s crew and the crew
of the one that was sunk gather together. Now
some come from the present Cushing, which is
a Spruance class destroyer. But my Cushing
was a Fletcher Class and the CIC in it was
something that had been invented by J.C.
Wylie, “Bill” Wylie, who had been on the orig-
inal Fletcher on the night it was sunk at the first
night battle of Guadalcanal. He was then in
another battle. Fletcher survived both battles
unscathed while we were losing ships right and
left and somebody figured out that the effective
use of radar made a lot of difference. So they
called Wylie back to Pearl Harbor and inter-
viewed him to see what was going on. He
developed the destroyer CIC doctrine before
there was a destroyer CIC. Then they sent him
back to Washington, where he designed a CIC
that just fit into the captain’s in port cabin. You
could just squeeze in around the DRT (dead
reckoning tracker) and there was the radar in
one corner and the sonar in another corner and
everyone was jammed into this CIC like sar-
dines in a can.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What were your
duties on the ship?
WAYNE HUGHES: I started out in the
gunnery department. Within about three
months, the executive officer made me his as-
sistant navigator, and after another six or nine
months I became the official navigator while
still an ensign. It’s a pretty remarkable story
that the captain and exec would trust an ensign
to be the navigator of a destroyer. That lasted
for most of my time on board, and then, since in
your first duty station you should be broaden-
ing your career base, I went to the engineering
department for the last nine months of my two
years on board. Then I went to the mine force.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was this related
to your OR interests?
WAYNE HUGHES: It was about that time
that my second connection with Operations Re-
search arose. I found in the wardroom an old
OEG (Operations Evaluation Group) publica-
tion, Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War II.
The first half of the book was a narrative history
of the Battle of the Atlantic with a lot of data in
it. The second half of the book was about Op-
erations Research techniques. I could see that
some of those Operations Research techniques
had been adopted in the tactical publications
we were using; that just grabbed me. I really
thought that it was the sort of thing that every
naval officer who expected to fight should
know. It was the essence of tactical thinking
with a quantitative twist.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: So your interests
came from the early days?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, even before I
went to the Naval Postgraduate School I knew
that Operations Analysis meant tactical analy-
sis. OK, lets not jump too far ahead now; we
were going on to my next duty in the mine
force. There, I was executive officer for eleven
months and then became one of the first com-
manding officers out of my class, a command-
ing officer of the minesweeper USS Humming-
bird (MSC 192), based first out of Charleston,
South Carolina and then Yorktown, Virginia. I
can tell you that command of a minesweeper
was a heckuva lot bigger challenge than com-
mand of a destroyer.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Why would you
say that?
WAYNEHUGHES: I realized it when I had
my destroyer command. At that time as a com-
mander, I had at least five officers and maybe
six who had more experience than I did when I
was commanding officer of my minesweeper.
In fact, at the low point of my wardroom’s
experience in the Hummingbird, the other
three officers had a total of eighteen months.
My executive officer had only one year in the
Navy. One officer had six months in the Navy,
and one officer had just reported aboard, this
being his first assignment.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: So you’re the se-
nior man with two years?
WAYNE HUGHES: I’m the senior man
who by this time has four years of experience,
all afloat.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You say the job
was challenging and more difficult?
WAYNE HUGHES:We had an administra-
tive check-off list that was as big and onerous
as the one for destroyers. It was literally a cou-
ple of inches thick and you parceled that out
among your three officers and your leading
petty officers, and this small handful of people
had to go through all the administrative things
that fifteen officers and fifteen CPOs (Chief
Petty Officers) would deal with in a destroyer.
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We were as heavily “over administered” as a
destroyer was. Now operationally in mine-
sweeping we did a lot of formation steaming.
Occasionally we ventured out alone, but usu-
ally we would steam in formation of four or
five ships operating together. Well, if you’re
steaming in a formation, whether you are a
hundred and forty-four feet long, which is what
we were, or three hundred and eighty feet long,
which is what a destroyer is, or even six hun-
dred feet long, which is what a cruiser is, the
intricacy of the maneuvers are not much differ-
ent. Next, by putting the minesweeping gear in
the water you now are in effect maneuvering a
system. You have a ship plus maybe moored
sweep gear, maybe magnetic sweep gear,
maybe acoustic sweep gear, maybe several of
them at the same time. With sweep gear in the
water, you are less maneuverable than an air-
craft carrier.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: An aircraft car-
rier?
WAYNE HUGHES: That is right, even less
maneuverable than an aircraft carrier. There
you are, with all your gear in the water, maybe
in formation, perhaps in a sort of a “V” forma-
tion, and along comes a merchant ship. Now
even though you’ve got your signal in the air,
either a day signal or night signal, that says
you’ve got minesweeping gear in the water and
they must stay clear from you, you can’t count
on that. What I’m indicating is that in many
ways a minesweeper command demanded
more seamanship and foresight than command
on a much larger ship.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was this done
often?
WAYNE HUGHES: When we operated in
the York River we used to make two landings a
day. We would get underway with students on
board and we would go out in the river and
throw the gear in the water. The students
would learn how to put the minesweeping gear
in the water and recover it. We’d come in about
twelve o’clock, tie up, and that class would
leave the ship. At about 1:00 or 1:30 another
class would come aboard and we’d get under
way, to do it again, and come in and make
another landing about 5:30 in the afternoon and
then that class would go ashore. I don’t know of
any better way to learn ship handling then to
get underway twice a day and make landings
twice a day. And it just so happens that these
were tricky waters too, because the tidal cur-
rents are pretty strong in the York River.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What was the
timeframe for all this activity?
WAYNE HUGHES: This all took place in
1956 and 1957. I took command in January of
1956 and gave up the ship in July or August of
1957. As I mentioned earlier, I started in
Charleston, South Carolina. I had command out
of Charleston for about half my tour, then the
whole division swapped with a division that
was in Yorktown and we became a school ship.
It was there when we did the things that I’ve
been describing.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: So you spent a lot
of time maneuvering and learning how to
search for stuff. This seems like some of the
events discussed in early writings of Opera-
tions Research.
WAYNE HUGHES: If you consider that
the best analyst is an able officer who has op-
erated a lot and has seen in our tactical publi-
cations the fruits of analytical work like the
bent line screen and what was called operation
Rum and Coke, then you have a strong tactical
planner. The Rum and Coke operation is a re-
orientation of an ASW (anti-submarine war-
fare) screen based on signals that caused a
screen to reform at an angle from the way you
were previously going. If you can see the logic
of a formation and the mathematics of station
keeping, and understand the problems of rela-
tive motion, then you have to think that tactics
is science as well as art.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You talk about
maneuver as a major planning process that you
have to think about well in advance. It appears
you were concentrating on the dynamics of
movement you encountered at sea?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes. After my tour at
the Naval Academy, I was the Operations Of-
ficer of another destroyer that operated with a
hunter/killer group. There were lots of times
when you would go after a submarine in what
was called a search attack unit with a couple of
ships to try and find and destroy an exercise
submarine. After simulating our attack, we
would have to rejoin and take our station. If
you come back and take station from “ahead,”
then you may have to do a turn that is approx-
imately a hundred and eighty degrees. Well,
imagine the time it takes to turn a ship. It takes
about two and one-half minutes. During the
turn, the movement of the rest of the formation
is substantial and so is your own transfer,
which is the off-access movement, and it can be
substantial too. It is as big as a turning circle of
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the destroyer. The “maneuvering board” we
used doesn’t solve that problem. The maneu-
vering board tells you what course and speed
to take when you’re going directly into the
station without accounting for advance and
transfer.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What did you do
in these special cases?
WAYNE HUGHES: I developed a little al-
gorithm I called the turning ellipse. It was all
geometric, no mathematics at all. But it worked
like a charm and I taught everybody in my
wardroom, then wrote it up and had it pub-
lished in one of the tactical pubs. When I got
here to the Naval Postgraduate School years
later I decided maybe I ought to see what the
mathematical formula really was. It turned out
that I was describing a mathematical cycloid.
Its proper name would’ve been the tactical cy-
cloid, but that didn’t have any buzz to it.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: It sounds like you
did applications thinking first and then worked
out the theory later.
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, I think art comes
before science, and science is merely a repre-
sentation of the dynamic structure and institu-
tionalization of what the practical wisdom of
people over the course of history develops. For
example, geology was invented because people
wanted to know where the coalfields were. As-
tronomy was invented because people found
out that the seasons could be predicted by the
stars and several centuries later that they could
also be used to find and keep track of their
locations.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Are you saying
that there seems to be a need that draws things
together, or a form of strife that creates a cir-
cumstance for people to learn things?
WAYNE HUGHES: Either one, but I don’t
want to over-dramatize. I think the message to
operations analysts is that we are practitioners.
We are in a practical science and we must not
get too enchanted by the theoretical side. To be
useful, we must always keep our roots in the
practical side.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What exactly
brought you back to school?
WAYNE HUGHES: It was in the ground of
my being that I should have a graduate degree.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did you know
this when you were first teaching at the Naval
Academy?
WAYNE HUGHES: I was accepted at the
Naval Postgraduate School when the Superin-
tendent of the Naval Academy talked me into
going there instead. Instead of going to
Monterey on my first shore tour, I came here on
my second shore tour as a Lieutenant Com-
mander in 1962 to 1964.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You served as an
instructor at the Naval Academy from 1957 to
1960. What did you do at the Academy?
WAYNE HUGHES: I taught and I worked
on a curriculum revolution in which we, as I
like to say, brought the Naval Academy out of
the nineteenth century and into the twentieth
century in both course content and pedagogy.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You were trying
to emphasize more of the hard sciences and
also more mathematics to support various
forms of tactics?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, but there’s a cer-
tain irony here. When I went back to the Naval
Academy I found I liked the social sciences and
humanities best. I also enjoyed subjects like
naval history, ethics, and English literature. The
reason I got called back to Annapolis for duty is
that I wrote an essay saying there are only two
kinds of Naval Academy graduates: those who
never want to see the place again, and those
who want to come back and straighten it out
someday. I said I’m in the second category and
here’s, by damn, what you ought to do. The
Superintendent Rear Admiral Bill Smedberg,
read it and said, “Now there is a young officer
I need to get back here.” The strange part of this
was that I was trying to make a case for more
naval history, more naval tactics, more of the
things that would go under the title naval sci-
ence. It was the farthest thing from my mind at
the time was that we needed to straighten out
the engineering sciences.
I couldn’t have been more wrong as it
turned out. I watched some really nifty naval
officers, mostly captains, overcome the resis-
tance of the existing faculty to upgrade the way
we were teaching, especially the science and
engineering subjects. It dawned on me that we
didn’t have room in the current curriculum to
add more social sciences and humanities. Ac-
tually what we advocated was to cut down on
things like teaching boilers and the old Mark IA
Fire Control computer to make room for engi-
neering science. We also freed up some class-
room time by allowing validation credit for
courses that students had taken earlier. Any-
way, I was there when this first great revolution
took place and even claim to have a small hand
in it.
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MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did they think
you were a rogue?
WAYNE HUGHES: Oh, yeah. I mean, I’d
go over and mix it up with the naval history
faculty who were some of the most prestigious
fellows on campus. Of course they viewed me
with suspicion because I was up there in the
Superintendent’s office. They thought there
was a conspiracy going on to upset their tradi-
tional ways. Academics are some of the most
reactionary people walking. They want to
change everybody’s life but their own.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Now might be a
good time to tell me how you got into Opera-
tions Research.
WAYNE HUGHES: There were two rea-
sons. One was the advice of my Rhodes scholar
executive officer and the other was reading
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) in World War II.
From that I went and found Search and Screen-
ing, the great classic by B.O. Koopman. I didn’t
know the mathematics used in that book and
I’m still not sure I do now, but I knew that
Koopman was on to something. And so I came
out here to the Naval Postgraduate School for
two years when the Operations Research de-
partment did not yet exist. At that time there
was only an Operations Analysis curriculum.
The timeframe for this was from 1962 to ’64
when the backbone of the curriculumwere gen-
tlemen like Doc Torrance and Peyton Cunning-
ham. There was a new chairman of the program
named Tom Oberbeck and there were a whole
flock of new professors arriving, most of whom
have now retired. When I came back 20 years
ago, many of them were still here, but none of
them are still on the faculty now except Bob
Read. They were about my age, but they are all
retired except for me.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What did they
have you doing when you first got here as a
student? You had been out of school for ten
years.
WAYNE HUGHES: It was hard. I found
out that I may have liked mathematics in high
school, but this was a different kettle of fish and
I had to apply myself the first couple of quar-
ters just to get up to speed in quantitative and
mathematical methods. It was not an easy be-
ginning, though it sweetened up the second
year. There was a turning point in all of this,
and this is important. Operations Research was
the first curriculum at the School that had an
experience tour. We called it a field trip then.
You would go out for six weeks to a Navy
agency doing Operations Analysis (OA), or to
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), or to
industry like Lockheed at the time. In my case,
I joined a real study group, but what I found
out was, I knew a lot more from school than I
realized I’d learned in my first academic year. I
felt like I could hold my own as an analyst and
could at least communicate with some great
analysts.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Let’s hear about
this study.
WAYNE HUGHES: It was a study per-
formed in Arlington, Virginia. The year is 1963
and Secretary McNamara was trying to under-
stand the nature of all the Services. The ques-
tion at issue was whether we can defend the
sea-lanes to Europe in a NATOwar, given there
are a lot of submarines in the Soviet inventory.
We were talking about a large number of sub-
marines, and a moderate to large number of
systems for ASW protection. It is a complicated
problem. Now as a student I didn’t know this
study was going on, and I was on my way to
the Institute for Naval Studies in Boston think-
ing I was going to have a great vacation for six
weeks, living in the graduate school dorm at
MIT and doing some make work kind of stuff.
I was there exactly two days when the com-
manding officer of the Institute for Naval Stud-
ies, a Navy captain and Medal of Honor winner
named George Street, called me in and said:
“Hughes, I’m gonna send you to Washington
and you’re gonna join the hottest, the most
important study in the Department of De-
fense.”
The name of the study was the Cyclops
Study because Secretary of Defense McNamara
had sent out one of his one-page taskers to all
the Services which was a list of studies he
wanted done, and study Number 1-I (one-eye)
had to do with shipping in the Atlantic in a
NATO war. Later on, we had Cyclops Two and
Three, and we had War at Sea Studies One,
Two, and Three. We even had a War at Sea
Now Study. In fact, there followed a whole
series of studies painting a picture of our ability
to protect shipping and where appropriate,
identify any weaknesses to expect in battles of
the Atlantic. But the first study I was assigned
to was the Granddaddy of them all.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: So much for the
summer vacation!
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, the vacation did
not materialize. In fact, we had nominally about
two months to do a study and I got there maybe
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two or three weeks into the thing and they were
already struggling. One of the “old greats” was
the project officer for the study. His name
was Joe Neuendorffer. A problem was that he
was more analyst than a study leader and so we
were already falling behind. While I was there,
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), or the
Secretary of the Navy, I’m not sure which, grew
alarmed that the study was not going to be
finished on time and so he replaced Joe as the
lead with a much more administrative analyst
named Jim Larkin. The Secretary of the Navy
was Paul Nitze, and Jim Larkin was on his staff
in the Office of Program Appraisal at that time.
Nitze sort of sent his own man over because he
knew that Larkin was more of a pusher.
When I got there, they had set up a Markov
chain model of the submarines deploying,
searching for their targets, finding their targets,
closing on them, and attacking those targets as
convoys. If a Soviet submarine survived that
chain of events, he would go off and look for
another convoy. It was a nifty model that for-
ever impressed me as my first experience with
something that was practical and useful in do-
ing a campaign level analysis. The analyst who
set up the model was Frank Houck. Frank was
then at CNA. In addition, a young fresh-caught
CNA analyst name Ken Bolin was there, and he
and I were sort of kindred spirits because we
were the guys down in the trenches that did the
mathematical computations using this splendid
looking Markov chain that involved a lot of
calculations.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did you learn the
Markov process at NPS before you went?
WAYNE HUGHES: I can’t remember. I
think I probably understood it in its abstract
form, but the way we used it, how it worked,
was pretty self-evident. I recall the notion of
“memorylessness” was discussed among the
analysts and whether the model was a suffi-
cient approximation of the real submarine cam-
paign to assume the Markov properties. I
thought then, and still do, that it was fine, and
there was no point in talking about odd situa-
tions where you treat the effects of past events,
which would spoil the Markov assumption.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How did things
proceed on the study?
WAYNE HUGHES: I’d been there about a
week when there was a big meeting. Joe
Neuendorffer was still in charge and the study
group, which consisted of about a dozen ana-
lysts doing different parts of the study. The
heart and soul of the study was what Frank
Houck and Ken Bohlin had been doing, and I
was thrown in to help them with the computa-
tion of the schedules. The schedules consisted
of so many submarines of such and such char-
acteristics trying to find and sink shipping and
so many convoys protected by such and such
numbers of escorts. I do not think that subma-
rine barriers were a big deal then. I think ASW
aircraft were a twinkle in the eye of Admiral
Martell and a few other visionaries, but the
hardcore of the analysis was an assumption
that the decisions would be reached in the con-
voys.
NOTE: The interview paused at this point,
and resumed at Quantico, Virginia with Wayne
Hughes, Mike Garrambone, and Dr. Bob Shel-
don, FS.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: It is the 9th of
June and Bob Sheldon and I are sitting today at
the Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research
Center, United States Marine Corps Base,
Quantico, Virginia with Wayne Hughes. Sir,
let’s continue the discussion of the Cyclops
study. Please remind us how everything went
and some of the activities that ensued there-
after.
WAYNE HUGHES: Picking up from last
time, I was on my student experience tour from
the Naval Postgraduate School having one year
under my belt and before my second year. One
of the interesting things about the Cyclops
study that I didn’t mention before was a deci-
sion whether or not to use a computer program
to do the Markov chain calculations that I was
describing, or to do them by hand. This was a
very important decision for a young Lieutenant
Commander Hughes and his accomplice, Ken
Bolin, because we knew that if we went “by
hand” we were going to be using mechanical
machine calculators deep into the night. Well,
the decision was made, wisely as it turned out,
to go both ways. That is, we did them by hand
and also attempted to write a computer pro-
gram in Fortran code. We found a young
woman to program the thing who said: “Oh, I’ll
have this ready in a couple of days and all
debugged.” When I left four weeks later, she
was still debugging the program. Since the
study was on a very short fuse, it was a good
thing that we did it by hand. But we did burn
the midnight oil many nights using hand cal-
culators with only Frank Houck, Ken Bolin and
myself to do the cranking.
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BOB SHELDON: How many states or
stages were you modeling in the Markov chain?
WAYNE HUGHES: There were probably
ten. What was involved was a circumstance
where a submarine would deploy. It would
then have to survive to get to a convoy. Then it
would go through a series of attacks on a
stream of convoys depending upon how many
torpedoes it had. Each time it would run the
gauntlet and be subject to attack. And then it
would have to safely get back to its base.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Remind us how
the title “Cyclops Study” was derived.
WAYNE HUGHES: “Cyclops” came from
question number 1-I (One Eye)—it’s a pun,
folks. Secretary McNamara sent down a series
of questions to the Services and question One
Eye was assigned to the Navy to estimate what
it would take to keep the sea lines open against
a large submarine threat in the 1960’s.
BOB SHELDON: Did that question come
from McNamara himself or his staff?
WAYNE HUGHES: That I don’t know, but
McNamara signed it out. So his staff might
have assembled the questions that were
thought to be the important ones. This one was
important because in a non-nuclear war there
was a feeling that we would fail if we couldn’t
keep the sea lines of communications open to
Europe.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did anyone re-
search to see if that problem had been looked at
before?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes. There was a pre-
cedent. In fact the Markov chain model had
been used in 1958 or 1959 in a US Navy study.
Frank Houck had participated in that, so it
wasn’t as if he had invented the model out of
whole cloth.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Tell us about
your first analyst tour.
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, but before I do
that, let me tell you one more thing about my
second year at graduate school. We all had to
write a thesis. When I was on my experience
tour a problem arose involving nuclear subma-
rines. The November class, which was the first
class of Soviet nuclear submarines, were just
coming from the shipyards and heading off to
sea. At the time, there were about ten of them in
a fleet of three hundred or so submarines that
could go out and attack shipping. Up until that
time, we had used a screen only in the forward
part of the convoy. It was called a Bentline
Screen to protect the front of the convoy be-
cause diesel submarines didn’t have the speed
to come in from the sides or from the rear.
Nuclear submarines had the speed to come in
from any direction, but if we protected three
hundred and sixty degrees instead of just the
forward hundred and twenty degrees we
would have to triple the length of the perimeter
that we were guarding. Using the same screen-
ing technique this would have diluted the
screen to one-third of its effectiveness in terms
of detection.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was this a big is-
sue?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, if the submarine
threat consisted of ten out of three hundred,
then you ignored it. You just took your licks
from SSNs and concentrated on the large num-
ber of diesels. But how long would this circum-
stance last? At some point you would have to
start accepting a greater success by the diesel
submarines in order to counter the nuclear sub-
marines in the three hundred and sixty degree
mode. I went back to NPS with this special
problem in mind for my thesis. This analysis
had to take into account a number of other
things. I solved for when that break point oc-
curred to shift to 360-degree protection and also
how far out on the perimeter the screen should
be placed. The farther out, the more you took
away an outside shot from the submarine but
the thinner the screen would become, which
would allow the submarines to penetrate and
attack from inside. Inside attack was the more
serious threat because once they got in they
were hard to chase out again. I enjoyed solving
that problem then, and it’s been something that
I continued to work on, off and on for the rest
of my days in uniform. I’ve always said that
any successful thesis should be something that
made you an expert in some little niche of
professional knowledge.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was there a
follow-on to this work?
WAYNE HUGHES: There was a student
about ten years ago named Keith Kowalski who
knew about this thesis and he said he wanted to
update it. I was his thesis advisor, and using the
same optimization of defense concept, he
adapted it for a lot of things that happened
since I did my thesis, like tactical towed sonars
and the effect of guided missile submarines
which could fire both torpedoes and missiles at
the formation. Of course, since then the Soviet
Union has collapsed. Neither the Hughes solu-
tion nor the Kowalski solution is relevant any-
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more. We now have a new situation that sort of
brings us back to the drawing board. Inshore
diesel submarines with torpedoes are the threat
de jour again, except that the water environ-
ment is much different and the number of at-
tacking submarines is much smaller. The whole
strategy of protection is different than it was.
We were talking about convoy defense. Today
we’re talking about a much more comprehen-
sive method which would include getting the
submarines in port, getting them in barriers,
and getting them by sanitizing a region
through which our warships or shipping will
pass.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Was your mathe-
matical formulation similar to Kowalski’s for-
mulation?
WAYNE HUGHES: His mathematical for-
mulation was identical to mine and that brings
up another point that I think has enduring
value. Both of us could optimize the screening
without knowing what our losses would be
once the optimum screen was in place. You
would have to do a campaign analysis that
depends on what you thought the total number
of submarines attacking was going to be in
order to see whether you could stand the losses.
What we had done was to derive the best thing
to do, the optimal solution without knowing
whether the optimal solution was going to be
good enough. Now that kind of thing comes up
again and again. The guy who doesn’t know
much about analysis can’t understand that you
can do the best you can and still not know
whether the best you can do will win or lose.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: It sounds like you
picked a thesis that was seaworthy and appli-
cable, but not necessarily a theoretical thesis.
This is something I’ve heard you speak about
before, which is you like to see the application
of knowledge.
WAYNE HUGHES: I also like to see real
solutions to real problems presented at MORS.
There is new theory that may help some day
and new gadgets that people are promoting,
but work which is demonstrably relevant to
today’s problems are the ones that get my juices
flowing.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: For the optimiza-
tion, did you use a linear or non-linear pro-
gramming formulation?
WAYNE HUGHES: It was linear in part
and non-linear in part. We made some assump-
tions, simplifying assumptions that is, for the
calculation of the circumferential distance at
which you should put the screen. It was sim-
plified to the extent that we assumed that at
max range when the submarine torpedo would
run out of fuel, we would call that the zero
point. When the submarine was just outside the
screen, outside the detection by the screen, then
we did a calculation of what the probable num-
ber of hits would be if it fired a big load, and
then we straight lined it in between. Then there
was a discontinuity. If the submarine pene-
trated the screen, snuck in and didn’t try to
shoot from outside but took his chances and got
inside the screen, then there was a step increase
in his performance because at that point he was
going to be able to fire a complete salvo, reload
and fire another before we could find him and
chase him away.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did you publish
your thesis in some journal?
WAYNE HUGHES: Sadly, I don’t remem-
ber it ever getting into the literature.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Were you able to
convince the Navy customer that this was a
reasonable approach?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes in the sense that
we used it for campaign analysis purposes
when it was applicable. Also, there was a spe-
cific use I’ll come to in a moment, but for tac-
tical use I did try to get the fleet interested by
sending out a questionnaire saying: “How
would you position your defenses if you were
facing this threat of part nuclear and part diesel
submarine?” The destroyer squadron com-
manders and their staffs who responded were
sent the completed thesis to show them how
one would determine where they should put
their screen. Insofar as I know, I simply over-
whelmed them with mathematics without any
practical effect on ASW defenses whatsoever.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Thus far, we have
talked about very tactical and technical jobs.
You were going to tell us about your first ana-
lytical tour.
WAYNE HUGHES: After I graduated from
NPS, I went back to the fleet and served a tour
as the “exec” of a destroyer. The exec of a
destroyer is like the deputy or number two
man. In a Navy command, he is the inside guy.
The commanding officer is the operational and
outside guy. When that was over, I was as-
signed to OP-96 (Systems Analysis Division) of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations;
when it was first created. Bud Zumwalt was the
first Director. His office was giving the Navy a
brand new analytical capability. The year was
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1966. And I’m a plank owner for this organiza-
tion since I was part of the original team. There
were some early people like Bob Hallex and Al
Rhode who were there for many years after that
and became almost institutions in their own
right. The original composition was ten civil-
ians and ten officers. The officers were not all
analysts because we didn’t have many officer
analysts at the time. We found out early that
good solid officers were valuable if they had
the right kind of sea experience. They became
practical operations analysts because they were
quick learners while on the job. This was a
decision made at the time that endures to this
day. We try and have three kinds of people in
about the same proportion. First, civilian ana-
lysts are the permanent core capability with the
corporate memory. Second, officer analysts
who are able to blend the technical knowledge
of analysis with the fleet experience they bring.
And third, officers who are principally opera-
tors but are head and shoulders kinds of guys
who tend to be future leaders who come and
learn the value and limitations of analysis on
the job. I’ll give you an example. Later (around
1973), when I came back as the Deputy Director
in OP-96, a guy named Vern Clark, now the
Chief of Naval Operations, was a Lieutenant
and the Administrative Assistant to the Direc-
tor. Vern, to this day, will say that experience
changed his life. His experience working in
OP-96 was one of the most significant tours he
had in learning how decisions ought to be
made and—not the same thing—how they are
often made. Another young Lieutenant in
OP-96 was Dennis Blair, just recently retired.
He rose to become Commander of the Pacific
theater. Dennis would also say that his experi-
ence in OP-96 was one of the most valuable
tours he had.
BOB SHELDON: Is that the same Admiral
Blair that was on the Joint Staff?
WAYNE HUGHES: As a flag officer, he
was briefly Director of OP-96 and then went to
the Joint Staff. He recently retired and is now at
IDA.
BOB SHELDON: The Al Rhode you men-
tioned, is that the same Al Rhode that’s a MORS
Fellow?
WAYNE HUGHES: That’s correct.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: In the description
of the three types of folks that came together to
do operational studies, were you looking at
them as a team or as individuals?
WAYNE HUGHES: I’m going to mention a
study in a minute which depended heavily on
all three kinds of characteristics, but OP-96 also
did a lot of fire fights, a quick turnaround,
almost overnight kinds of analyses where the
Director would form a team but it usually con-
sisted of just two people who were a subject
matter expert teamed with a technical expert.
Very often you didn’t do any analysis. You
went out and gathered data. You knew what
studies had been done in the past. You knew
who was knowledgeable on the subject at the
CNA or IDA or RAND and you went to these
people and then put together a point paper for
the CNO or the Vice-Chief or the old Director of
Plans and Programs who we call N8 now. The
point being that the analyst knowing what
work had been done and the Naval officer be-
ing familiar with the issues and the operational
side of the problem were often as important as
the analysis they did.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Do we still grow
those kinds of teams today?
WAYNE HUGHES: The CNO thinks that
we need to restore some of the rigor to our
decision making process. And that’s been a
boon at the Naval Postgraduate School because
we’ve seen a rise in the numbers coming into
the Operations Analysis curriculum. I don’t
think there was ever a time when the analysis
was as consistently well done and influential as
it was in the McNamara years. Hitch and En-
thoven and the other whiz kids at the time took
a lot of heat because as many a wise officer has
said: “You can’t make decisions purely based
on analysis.” On the other hand, because the
Secretary of Defense proclaimed, somewhat
hypocritically, that all decisions would be
based on analysis, everybody paid a lot of at-
tention. And the good of it was that we really
did create a talented group of people who did a
lot of good work and were listened to. I per-
sonally think that Alain Enthoven, who was the
Director of OSD Systems Analysis at the time,
was delighted with the Services developing
these high quality, high skilled studies and
analyses because he knew that he didn’t have
the corporate knowledge in OSD. If the Services
would take their best shot at doing a good
analysis to prove their case, and it was done
objectively (he generally could tell whether it
was slanted or not), then he knew he was get-
ting the best advice and could make better de-
cisions. So we did grow analysts back then and
their analysis had influence the likes of which I
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don’t think is ever going to be seen again. In
addition, we sent some very talented officers
who became leaders of the Navy to work in
OSD Systems Analysis: Bob Monroe, Staser
Holcomb, Jerry Miller, and Stan Turner were
four of them.
BOB SHELDON: You mean that analysis
won’t have the same influence unless we get
another McNamara as the Secretary?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, but I don’t really
think that’s a good idea either. Secretary Mc-
Namara’s worst decisions had to do with the
Vietnam War. But insofar as the skillful use of
analysis was concerned, he did pretty well. Pat
Parker is another old hand who’s a good friend
and who was in OSD systems analysis in those
days, later was an acting Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence in OSD and a good friend of Ad-
miral Zumwalt’s. Pat always spoke generously
of McNamara and said, “If you knew what you
were talking about you could always get a
reading from him and usually a decision.”
There’s an old debate in the analytical com-
munity over the extent to which an analyst
should simply lay out the results and the limi-
tations of the analysis, versus going beyond
providing results and including conclusions
and recommendations. You can call it either
way, and I think it depends a great deal on who
your customer is and the extent to which he
understands what he can get out of the analy-
sis. But if the customer doesn’t understand
analysis, he will probably either ignore it com-
pletely or put too much weight on it. I have in
mind wise customers like Admiral Zumwalt
and three later CNO’s: Admiral Holloway, Ad-
miral Hayward, and Admiral Carl Trost, who
were experienced in analysis and knew how to
use it. There were people in the fleet as well
who had the same kind of skill, like Staser
Holcomb and Ike Kidd. Another one was Fred
G. Bennett whom I worked for very closely
when he was Commander of ASWFORLANT
and I was his deputy for analysis. The point
being that a good customer who knows the
capabilities and limitations of analysis asks the
right questions, and wants an objective ap-
praisal, even if it’s not what he wanted to hear.
That’s the kind of guy that you like to work for.
BOB SHELDON: Where was your OP-96
office located?
WAYNE HUGHES: In the A-ring on the
fourth deck of the Pentagon.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How long was
your tour there?
WAYNE HUGHES: The first time was for
two years. In the latter part of that tour I was
very much involved in the major fleet escort
study that had on it another one of my favorite
people, Charlie Woods. Charlie was my nomi-
nal boss for the ASW analysis part of that
study. When it was done, it turned out to be
one of the most influential studies ever done in
the sense that for about twenty years after that
it determined the number of escorts that would
be associated with different kinds of forces like
convoys, carrier battle groups, amphibious
groups and so on.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: This had to be a
classified study?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, this was a secret
study. Probably no longer classified now. It
doesn’t need to be secret any longer.
MIKE GARRAMBONE:Howwas it work-
ing in the late Sixties in the Pentagon, working
with McNamara’s whiz kids?
WAYNE HUGHES: The CNO himself
would frequently be the recipient of studies, if
not him, then the Director of Program Planning.
The Secretary of the Navy was Paul Nitze who
understood analysis as well as anybody. Since
he was very astute, he personally would take
critical studies. Since we believed that these
studies would be used to make decisions, we
would give frequent progress reports. The
terms of reference for the study would be care-
fully vetted ahead of time. Every two to three
weeks we would come in and make a progress
report. Those of us who were doing the work
thought: “C’mon now, give us some time to do
our job.” But on the good side, the frequent
briefings meant that by the time the study was
complete, the surprises were all over with. Ev-
erybody knew what the nature of the surprises
were going to be and they were prepared for
them and they knew why the study was com-
ing out the way it did, and so the study tended
to be compelling.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: As a young O-5 at
the time, what level people were you briefing?
WAYNE HUGHES: Vice Admirals and
above. One of the wise pieces of advice from
Charlie Woods was, “Wayne, don’t be scared.
You’re going to know more about the subject
than anybody else in the room. Just go in there
and strut your stuff.”
MIKE GARRAMBONE: So as an analyst,
you did more than just deliver coffee to the
Admirals?
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WAYNE HUGHES: I felt like I was right in
the middle of it.
BOB SHELDON: Were the briefings ever
published as studies or papers?
WAYNE HUGHES: These were really
working papers. They contained the analytical
approach, the critical assumptions, and the re-
sults of the analysis to date. An interesting and
critical part of the ASW analysis, which was
what I was mainly concerned with, was the
detection ranges of the new sonar candidates.
And for that, there was a lot of debate over
whether we were going to make active detec-
tions in the convergent zone and whether there
would be “bottom bounce” detections the way
we had been getting detections using passive
sonar in submarines. Interestingly enough, our
answer turned out to be wrong—too optimistic.
But the technical community predicted that un-
der the right water conditions, we would get
detections as much as twenty-five miles out.
And that was with active sonar. Essentially we
never saw that performance. But it was those
kinds of technical predictions that were critical
and we wanted to be sure everybody was
aware of the detection values that went into the
campaign level part of the study.
The technical (detection) input affected the
tactics of protection for each kind of formation,
which in turn influenced the macro-campaign
analysis that was going to determine the right
number of forces to buy. The right number of
forces depended on an analytic scheme intro-
duced to us by Charlie Dibona who was then in
the Office of Program Appraisal under Paul
Nitze, the SECNAV. It said the right number of
forces to buy is as many escorting forces up to
the point where the cost of buying one more
escort was more than the value of the forces
being saved by the protection. Said in another
way, at some point you reach a point of dimin-
ishing returns. A better solution than buying
more protection is to buy more of the protected
forces. A related theoretical problem was
whether that means you should actually buy
more protected forces before the war based on
what you expect to lose during the war. This is
a shorthand way of addressing some really
complicated issues. But the short answer was
no because you don’t expect to come out of the
war with the same number of forces that you
have going into it. What you can do is make a
more informed judgment about losses when
you buy the efficient number of forces accord-
ing to Dibona criterion.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How did you feel
about your NPS background? Did you feel that
you had a pretty solid technical background for
working in the Pentagon?
WAYNE HUGHES: I thought then and
think to this day that even though there were
lots of gaps in what I learned that it didn’t
matter very much. The important thing was
that I had been steeped with enough of the
tools and the mindset of doing objective anal-
ysis. From that base, whatever I additionally
needed I could either work out myself or find
help. There was a very funny situation that
arose. We were looking at what we thought
was a really poor analysis being done for Ad-
miral Martell, OP-95, the ASW branch of OP-
NAV. There was a fellow in OSD who really
wanted what the analysis purported to sup-
port. He said that his understanding came to-
gether while at a stoplight driving into work
one morning. He said he’d figured out the anal-
ysis proved, when you looked at it carefully,
that the effectiveness was invariant as a func-
tion of the number of ASW forces you had. In
other words, if you had doubled the number of
forces, you would double the effectiveness.
Well, if that was the case, this was going to
absolutely make the case for this new ASW
system. Admiral Zumwalt asked me if this
could possibly be true. And I said: “Well, it
sounds very weird, sir. Let me think about it.”
I struggled till midnight or one in the morning
over the claim and finally realized that this
particular analyst in OSD had used the wrong
function. He should have been using an expo-
nential function but he was using the logarith-
mic function. Therefore what he argued was
definitely not true.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Point settled?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes, that was the end
of that.
BOB SHELDON: What are the kinds of
things that you read in those days?
WAYNE HUGHES: I probably did as little
background reading then as ever in my life. The
typical day was from 7:00 in the morning till
7:00 or 8:00 at night, with one break to play
squash during the day. So the answer, for that
particular time, is probably I was so busy read-
ing job-related memoranda, quick turn around
studies, and one-pagers, that I didn’t really stay
up with either technical or world events.
There is something important to say here
about when you get to be a high-level decision
maker. If you haven’t got your battery “fully
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charged” when you go into the job, you will
find you just don’t have time to catch up. What
you do is to pick staff members who under-
stand this and give you the essential things
about intelligence, about the latest trends in
world events, and the things that are likely
going to affect the future of analysis if that is
going to be your world. I mean things like
complexity theory and chaos theory and the
issues of how to construct useful simulations
instead of overly detailed simulations, those
kinds of things to be made aware of. Or take the
questions of modern fratricide, or how to build
an understanding of the command and control
process, or how to win wars by having better
detection capabilities. All of those are things
that you as a decision maker will get second-
hand input as opposed to first-hand knowl-
edge. So just surround yourself with people
who have more time than you do to stay
abreast, then you’ll be the best informed of
anybody because you are the only one who
takes time to be the synthesizer of all this.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: It sounds like
you’re making a case for students to study a lot
of things when they’re in school and the envi-
ronment is right for them to learn. All the prep-
aration is for the jobs you envision they will
have when they take on problems in the future.
WAYNE HUGHES: Actually I applied that
theory when I was a student. I remember that
statistics baffled me. I had two elective slots,
and I very carefully chose the professors that I
trusted who were statisticians. One of themwas
Jack Borsting; the other was Max Woods. I took
advanced statistics from them, risking all in
terms of grades because I knew that if I didn’t
get a better understanding at NPS, I’d never get
it later. As a result, I know what I don’t know.
And I mean to tell you, there are a lot of tricks
to the trade in the world of statistics. And a lot
of things that you can screw up if you’re not
careful, including spurious cause and effect re-
lationships that don’t exist.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did you continue
your analytic discussions when you went to the
courts to play squash?
WAYNE HUGHES: A good friend of mine,
Mike Melich, used to love to play squash with
me when I was the Deputy. I knew it was
because he figured while we were dressing
he’d have some time to lobby me. I enjoyed
playing squash with him anyway.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Tell us about the
fleet side of your life.
WAYNE HUGHES: I think that in the Six-
ties the emphasis on analysis shifted away from
the fleet and back towards decision making in
Washington. Ever since then, there has been a
widespread feeling that if there weren’t dollars
involved in the decision then it wasn’t impor-
tant for analysts to be engaged. But it’s good to
remember that the roots of analysis in World
War II came when scientists went to war and
they went out to help make better operational
decisions. There’s a good reason why fleet anal-
ysis is in many ways more important than
Washington analysis. In Washington there can’t
help but be limitations on the quality of analy-
sis when you’re dealing with paper airplanes
and paper ships and conjectures about the way
systems are going to work. These circum-
stances will inevitably affect your decision
whether to buy items when you’re perform-
ing systems analysis and cost effectiveness
analysis.
Now contrast this with the fleet side of
things where everybody’s working on the same
team. When analysts went to sea they were
motivated because they knew they would go
down with the ship just like everybody else.
This state of affairs kind of focuses your atten-
tion on doing the best you can.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What was your
fleet duty like?
WAYNE HUGHES: I should point out I
first went back and had my Command tour.
From there I went to First Fleet staff. The rele-
vance of that was not so much that I was in an
Ops Analyst billet, but that I worked for Isaac
C. Kidd, Jr. Ike Kidd was one of the Navy’s
greats and he also understood how to use anal-
ysis better than the average guy. He went out of
his way to make sure that he was tuned in to
what fleet analysts were doing. He also had a
civilian fleet analyst on his staff. I was nomi-
nally an analyst, but I was really a staff guy
who understood enough analysis to put an ob-
jective and quantitative slant on things now
and then. I think the civilian analyst really
should be protected from staff work and keep
close to Commander who should have him
working on analysis problems almost exclu-
sively. The civilian analyst on the staff works
that way, while the military analyst does staff
work, but with the objectivity of an analyst. I do
think the roles should be different. That is es-
pecially true if the military analyst views him-
self as being groomed for Command, which
means that he isn’t just solving analytical prob-
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lems, but he’s very much in the middle of the
operational aspects of the problem as well. The
“doing” of the operation is as demanding as the
planning of it and the analysis of it when it’s
over.
Anyway, the Ike Kidd tour was really in-
teresting. I arrived almost the same time Kidd
took command of First Fleet in San Diego and
left within a few weeks of when he left. From
there I went to SACLANT. I was totally into
analysis at SACLANT and we did two memo-
rable studies while I was there. I had a very
good relationship with my boss, who was a
civilian. Ralph Nahra was consumed with a lot
of things other than analysis, for example, the
politics of SACLANT Centre, which was in La
Spezia, Italy. But Ralph knew and trusted me
enough to give me a lot of freedom to maneu-
ver in doing these two studies. One was asso-
ciated with supporting SACLANT in what
were called force proposals. Every two years,
SACLANT would come in to the NATO Mili-
tary Committee and Defence Planning Com-
mittee (the civilian leadership), and say what
our requirements were in order to carry out our
job of protecting ships at sea. This was kind of
a marketing thing where you knew that your
forces were inadequate to do the job with a
high assurance of success. Trying to describe
what would give you the highest assurance of
success was technically a difficult challenge be-
cause you’re talking about maybe a five or ten
percent increase in forces and you had to figure
out how to demonstrate that that would make
something more like a fifty percent increase in
reducing losses or something else like that.
BOB SHELDON: Were you competing
with resources from the Pacific, since this was
during the Vietnam era?
WAYNE HUGHES: That was kind of a
sideshow. The Vietnam War was drawing
down because we are now around 1972. The
thing you wanted was to get the NATO nations
to pony up more money for Navy forces. This
was very difficult to do in Europe because the
NATO nations in Europe were Army oriented.
Most of the members of the Military Committee
were Generals. When I testified before them,
they were asking me very hard questions about
whether we really needed more ships, naval
aircraft and ASW protection, because in their
eyes, they needed more ground forces. In some
ways they were right, but we could have used
more forces everywhere to face off against the
Soviet force, because we were pretty vulnerable
at the time. Be that as it may, our analysis had
appearances of a marketing device. I don’t
mean to say we corrupted the analysis, but I do
mean to say that the nature of the problem was
to demonstrate why a small increment of addi-
tional forces would have a large payoff. We
used a campaign model which was already de-
veloped when it arrived. If I remember cor-
rectly, Jerry Bracken of IDA developed it. We
just adapted it. It was very much a campaign
level analysis tool.
The second analysis I was part of was quite
different in nature. It was called a defense of
shipping study. The NATO navies were con-
cerned that we truly did not have enough pro-
tection and that our losses at sea would be
astronomical. It soon became apparent that
they had a limited understanding that the strat-
egy of the American ASW forces was to be
offensive. We counted on the indirect protec-
tion of submarine barriers and long range ASW
aircraft. Most NATO folks were still thinking in
terms of World War II convoy escort.
In a sense some of our work could be seen
as an education effort, but it also involved do-
ing analysis that was objective. In those days,
there was very little data in NATO. I’ve got to
say that since then—the early 1970’s—NATO
developed an analysis capability that was very,
very good. In the Eighties, it was quite robust.
My approach, having done ASW analysis in the
Pentagon, was to crib from US studies, and
without ever saying so, we used effectiveness
data that could be gleaned from our own stud-
ies. There was also a need to get everybody on
board. And the way we did that was to call a
meeting just outside London at CINC EAST-
LANT. The purpose was to involve at least one
representative from each of the nations and at
least two representatives from each of the Com-
mands. We at SACLANT, who led the study,
outlined the nature of the problem. We had
twenty questions and we farmed those out to
little teams. Bear in mind; if you’re a member of
a NATO Command, you don’t actually expect
to do any work, you just sort of get along with
each other. So here we were and we were ac-
tually going to work. This was like going back
into their own national institutions and having
to sit down and think things through and
achieve results. We worked for about two
weeks. And each of the teams came back feeling
good about their answers. We on the Steering
Committee also felt pretty good about their
answers. The answers were all kinds of “going
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in” things that were needed in the study to
assemble the operational elements for the pro-
tection of shipping; the manner in which the
sailings would occur, the assembly of convoys,
the size of the convoys, the configuration of the
convoys, the role of ASW in these operations,
the danger from mines, the air threat to the
ports where the goods would be unloaded—a
whole raft of questions like that. The hidden
agenda was to get the participants on board,
give them a vested interest in the success of the
study. And then promise that as the analysis
unfolded, that we would share the results and
the progress of the study, the interim results,
the way it was going and so on.
We used a very large campaign model that
had been developed at SACLANT Centre in La
Spezia, Italy. I made about three or four trips to
La Spezia to try out different things. We did
something unusual that I’m to this day very
proud of. We used the model with World War
II inputs to see if the model could be validated
against World War II data; that is, could we
“predict” losses that were similar to the losses
experienced in the Atlantic? A Scandinavian
analyst, To¨re Kristensen, did the work. We
found it worked pretty well if you used World
War II detection range, shipping flow rates, and
densities of German U-Boats and made some
assumptions about wolf packs. We got results
that were comparable to merchant ship losses
in the North Atlantic in World War II.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What prompted
you to go that route?
WAYNE HUGHES: Model validation
through history was always something I
thought we needed to do more of. I think we
need to do more of it now. But let me return to
our study approach and a second thing that
was memorable. Until the study, everybody
assumed that the peacetime cargo flows would
be the same as wartime flows. Now, if the
volume of shipping in wartime is comparable
to what it is in peacetime, then the numbers of
things you have got to protect at sea is abso-
lutely overwhelming. There were twelve or
thirteen thousand merchant vessels in NATO’s
peacetime trade! You cannot possibly cover
that volume of traffic, and there’s no point in
convoying because there will be so much ship-
ping that you’ll have about one-half of an escort
per convoy. All the US hoped to do was escort
vital military shipping between US and Euro-
pean ports.
I thought to myself, “Well, maybe, you
aren’t gonna be sending all those BMW’s to the
US and Chryslers to Europe in wartime, so let’s
see what we can find out about what might be
wartime levels compared with peacetime lev-
els.” We made a full-bore effort to see if any-
body had ever done this and the answer was
no. So we simply first displayed the results if
you used a hundred percent peacetime ship-
ping and then we reduced the volume down to
eighty, sixty, and forty percent. Forty percent of
peacetime would be the presumed minimum
flow of shipping. That analysis demonstrated
that the biggest volume and longest lines of
communication were, as you might guess, for
petroleum. And that if you could reduce the
volume of oil being transferred at sea—because
consumption in Europe was curtailed to sixty
percent instead of a hundred percent of peace-
time and if you did things like rationing in the
US, all of a sudden you lost interest in the
Middle East. That is, you didn’t need Middle
East oil. When you got the oil from Nigeria and
Venezuela and Alaska and Libya, you could
shorten your lines. If your oil consumption is
eighty percent of peacetime, then all of the sud-
den the convoy escort requirement is down at
forty percent. There is that much of a non-
linearity between consumption and the length
of the sea lines that you have to protect.
BOB SHELDON: What compensation
might have come from things going to Europe
for the war?
WAYNE HUGHES: We never looked at
how much the military operations were going
to increase demand at the front. We rational-
ized that by saying: “Well, the people who are
driving cars back in France are gonna be con-
suming less, so the tanks in Germany can con-
sume as much as they need to fight the war.” In
that sense our study was kind of hokey. But let
me tell you that there was a study done later—I
believe it was by SACLANT, because the inter-
est stayed on in SACLANT—about ten or fif-
teen years later which was done not by guess or
parametrically, but by actually looking at likely
consumption. I felt vindicated because sixty
percent of peacetime was what they worked
out as the probable level of actual wartime
consumption.
BOB SHELDON: Where was your
SACLANT office?
WAYNE HUGHES: It was in Norfolk right
next to CINCLANT, in the CINCLANTFLT
compound near the Norfolk Naval Base.
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BOB SHELDON: Did you go to Europe to
work with your Naval counterparts?
WAYNE HUGHES: Maybe four times to
Brussels and London and to La Spezia three or
four times. SACLANT Centre’s people were
formally attached to SACLANT. The people in
London were in a different component of
NATO. CINCCHAN was the London compo-
nent of NATO. There was a little Command at
Lisbon called COMIBERLANT.
BOB SHELDON: Did any of your NATO
counterparts have analytic degrees or analytic
backgrounds?
WAYNE HUGHES:Most of the analysts at
SACLANT Centre were civilians who did ana-
lytical or scientific research. SACLANT Centre
did more oceanographic work than analytical
work. In SACLANT proper, there was a very
small analysis staff in 1972. In my time it was
just one Brit, one young American computer
whiz, the Director, and me. Sometimes analysis
was a one-man show. Later it grew into a fairly
sizable operation. And I think very effective.
The Brit team, whom I got to know very
well later, were all operators as opposed to
analysts, but they had been doing a big data
gathering effort. They were, you might say,
self-taught. They had rigorous and objective
minds, but definitely self-taught. Now that I
think about it, all were operators as opposed to
analysts.
We had a couple of very capable Germans
getting PhD’s at the Postgraduate School that
came to SACLANT. I went back to Jack Borst-
ing at NPS and asked him if he had any stu-
dents from the NATO nations that could do
short tours in Norfolk. Both of them were really
talented and did very useful analytical work,
real computational work during those six
weeks with me. Since then, the Germans have
built their own analysis and educational estab-
lishments, so we don’t see many at NPS any
more.
After two years, I was ordered to
ASWFORLANT staff. The Commander was
VADM Fred G. Bennett. He had had a lot of
Pentagon experience. In fact, he had been Di-
rector of Navy Program Planning and really
knew how to use analysis. I was then a fresh-
caught Navy Captain and was his Assistant
Chief of Staff for Analysis. We did several at-
sea exercises that were carefully planned, care-
fully executed, and carefully reconstructed and
analyzed. This was a lot of fun with a great
sense of accomplishment.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: What was the
time frame for those events?
WAYNE HUGHES: It was 1973. And just
to show you that this was no accident,
ASWFORLANT was subsumed as part of Com-
mander Second Fleet Staff and Commander
Second Fleet didn’t know about, nor care about,
analysis. He was a great people person, but
analysis was not his bag, and so for the last
three or four months I was there, I was frus-
trated because I felt like he didn’t need any
analysts because he didn’t know how to use
them.
BOB SHELDON: Where was ASWFOR-
LANT? Was that also in Norfolk?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes. I moved my office
literally one block down the street.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: You talked about
two things that were of interest to the peace-
time Navy. The first was the execution of exer-
cises, which is more or less practice for the
military to prepare for war. But then you also
mentioned the data gathering that takes place
during those exercises. How do you see data
and data collection matching up? Did you have
a collection mechanism for getting data or did
you have to create one when you went to exer-
cises?
WAYNE HUGHES: If there is an analysis
being done from a cold start without any data,
you’re in deep trouble. There had better be a
body of data that already has been collected on
things such as detection ranges and sweep
rates. Your analysis had better be adding an
increment to the knowledge base, which is of-
ten the purpose for doing the analysis in the
first place.
BOB SHELDON:Did you ever run into the
case where you finally had to tell your boss
what you thought was important and what he
should really be interested in?
WAYNE HUGHES: At ASWFORLANT,
the boss was so good—this is Fred Bennett
mind you—that there was never any question.
We always had a good idea what our data
collection effort was going to be, how we were
we going to do it, and what we were supposed
to get out of it. We also had some pretty specific
problems that we were addressing at the time.
One thing I do remember is going to sea with a
tactical commander who was executing one of
these analytical efforts and he was so rigid in
his outlook that he said: “No departures from
the analytical plan.” The issue was the follow-
ing. We were the flagship and we were on a
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little LPH (Landing Platform Helicopter—it’s a
small helicopter carrier for amphibious opera-
tions), but we were pretending to be the new
Sea Control Ship, which was one of the CNO’s,
Admiral Zumwalt’s, pet projects. The com-
mander in charge of the experiment didn’t
much believe in analysis and he didn’t much
believe in the Sea Control Ship. We had this
carefully designed tactical formation. We
formed up and ran it through a string of sub-
marines. The idea was to force as many inter-
actions as we could with these submarines to
see whether the Sea Control Ship and its escorts
could detect all or most of the submarines that
were threatening us. On the occasion I’m de-
scribing, a submarine was coming right down
the throat. It was dead ahead. It had been de-
tected. We had an experimental towed array
sonar ship ahead of us, which held solid contact
on the “enemy” submarine. In fact, the ship
was detecting just about every submarine and it
was very apparent that towed arrays were go-
ing be the wave of the future for surface ASW.
But right then, it was also apparent that if we
didn’t dodge the submarine, then it was going
to come right down on us and fire a torpedo at
us. So I went into CIC and said, “Aren’t you
gonna take evasive action?” And they said:
“No, we’re gonna steady steam, same course,
same speed.” So I went up and urged the Ad-
miral to take an evasive course. But he said:
“We can’t change the plan.” And I said: “But
it’s my plan, sir.” {Laughter} He said, “No, I’m
not gonna change, it might cause the helicop-
ters more trouble in taking off and landing.” So,
I did a little mental calculation and I figured the
submarine was going to show up around 1:00
in the morning, so at 12:30 I went up and
looked for the green flare. A green flare was
what the submarine fired to pretend it was
making a torpedo attack. Lo and behold, at
12:45, here comes the green flare out of the
water. Well, in the larger scheme of things, this
didn’t matter a wit because the exercise recon-
struction demonstrated that that particular sub-
marine had been detected and would have
been attacked and probably sunk. But the
thought remains that it was very frustrating to
have an admiral in command who took an ex-
ercise plan so literally that he wasn’t going to
avoid a certain attack.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Tell us about
some of your other experiences.
WAYNE HUGHES: In my three tours in
the fleet, we emphasized the importance of fleet
analysis. I have the feeling that we’ve lost the
art. I’m not the only one who thinks that our
ability to do fleet analysis has decayed. There is
a SUBDEVRON TWELVE fiftieth anniversary
book—it’s a big fat book in fact—which cov-
ered the memories of the people who had been
in the Submarine Development Group during
the Sixties, Seventies, and Eighties. A series of
at sea experiments called Big Daddy and Little
Daddy were done at the Submarine Develop-
ment Group. Admiral Bob Fountain who had
been one of the SUBDEVRON Commanders
was quite caustic in criticizing the loss of ana-
lytical capability and loss of rigor in analysis
since those days. I think ASW analysis was the
best in the world then. I’ve been told that AAW
(Anti-Air Warfare) analysis was also strong,
but I wasn’t involved. Some of us think we do
need to try to revitalize our ability to do careful
exercise analysis in the fleet.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: How do you
think this might be done?
WAYNE HUGHES: I think that may be
happening now in that Admiral Ron Route at
the Naval Warfare Development Center New-
port has been given a charter under Com-
mander of Fleet Forces Command to conduct a
series of experiments under a sea trial program.
He will conduct sea trials, experiments, and
exercises at sea in a structured way. So I’m
hopeful that maybe we’ll rebuild this more rig-
orous analytical capability at sea. At the Post-
graduate School there is also a re-emphasis on
the fleet side of OA.
After ASWFORLANT and Second Fleet
staffs, I was invited back to be the Deputy in
OP-96, a second tour in the Pentagon. That was
a wonderful tour with two really fine bosses.
One was Rear Admiral Harry Train who went
on to be CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT and
one of the most capable leaders I’ve ever
worked for. The second was Rear Admiral Sta-
ser Holcomb, very capable and a dear friend.
Admiral Train was not an analyst and he grew
up in the policy science world. He wanted me
as his deputy as somebody who did under-
stand analysis. The net effect was that he kind
of left me alone. If it was an analytical problem,
I was in charge and if it was an issue that had
components of analysis and policy then he was
in charge. When Staser Holcomb came in as the
director of OP-96, he had an analytic back-
ground himself, so we split up the workload
somewhat differently. I would take, I’m guess-
ing here, but for illustration, the ASW side, and
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he would take the air side. But he would take
ASW in instances say when there were hot
button issues that the CNO personally was in-
terested in. In any event, both of them were
wonderful leaders and I’d like to mention again
that Vernon Clark was the Administrative As-
sistant under both of them. Bill Hancock was
my personal assistant. He went on to be a Vice
Admiral and a superb leader. Grant Sharp was
there and went on to be a Rear Admiral and
was the Navy liaison on General Schwartz-
kopf’s staff during Desert Storm. Guy Zeller
worked alongside Grant Sharp. Will Rogers
was another personal assistant to me. All four
of them had studied OR in Monterey and all
four viewed themselves primarily as operators
and not primarily as analysts. They are truly
my kind of guys who believe you use analysis
wherever you are and in whatever you’re do-
ing, not just when you’re in a “P-coded” billet
on a staff.
Those were heady days, not because Admi-
ral Zumwalt, who had been the founding di-
rector of OP-96, was now the Chief of Naval
Operations. He very much knew the capabili-
ties and limitations of analysis. He was re-
placed by Admiral Jim Holloway. I don’t know
where Holloway learned to use OP-96 effec-
tively, but I know that he did. And in many
ways we were as close to him as we were to
Admiral Zumwalt before him.
One of the things the deputy was associ-
ated with was liaison with CNA. I went over
there every two weeks and they would brief
whatever the study of interest was at the time.
The CNO wanted us to vet all of his Congres-
sional testimony to make sure that it was con-
sistent. One other funny thing bears telling. It
was only about two years since we did the
SACLANT Defense Shipping Study. It took
quite awhile to wind its way through the
NATO review process. But in due course, it got
to the Secretary of Defense’s office after I’d
arrived in OP-96. The Secretary of Defense sent
it to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of
the Navy said, “Well, this is something the
CNO should have.” And the CNO said, “This is
an analysis so obviously it should go to OP-96.”
So I ended up reviewing my own study.
{Laughter} Even after two years had passed, I
decided it was still a pretty good study.
We did both the long, deep studies such as
those for the CNO and the Defense of Shipping
Study, and short fuse analysis that were quick
turnaround kinds of things that you had just a
long weekend to answer.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Did any of those
studies have a really big impact at the time?
WAYNE HUGHES: Admiral Zumwalt
wanted to wring out the real value of high
speed. Another friend, Tom Meeks, was made
the Project Officer to examine the value of
speed. I’d have to say that what Zumwalt really
had in mind was a surface effects ship or hy-
drofoil. Without nuclear power, a surface ef-
fects ship burned too much fuel and one of the
conclusions of the study was exactly that. But
Admiral Rickover didn’t think much of the
light weight nuclear reactor needed for the SES
(Surface Effect Ship) so it never went anywhere.
But overall, the study itself did not conclude
that high speed, and I mean a difference be-
tween, say, thirty-five and sixty knots, con-
tained high value. A high-speed surface ship
was sort of halfway between the advantages of
a ship over an aircraft, which was carrying a lot
of stuff but not very fast, and the value of an
aircraft over a ship which was that the aircraft
would always beat the ship, even if it was only
a helicopter, in delivering less stuff but at a
much higher speed. We’re still struggling with
that. It’s an issue that re-emerges even today. Is
there a case for sixty-knot ship or even a fifty-
knot ship? I think the answer’s going to be “you
take all the speed you can get when it doesn’t
cost you much.” And therefore you should be
working on new hull forms to see if you can get
an increased speed without a large change in of
cost, payload, and fuel consumption. But cer-
tainly at the time of the study Meeks did, you
couldn’t make a case for high speed except to
escape.
MIKE GARRAMBONE: Please tell us
what your first MORS event was like and how
you got involved in the Society.
WAYNE HUGHES: Rather than trust my
memory here, I’ve dredged up the file of my
first MORS. It was the 28th, at Fort Lee, in
November 1971. I was a commander on
SACLANT staff at the time, and Fort Lee was
an easy drive up from Norfolk. I had been
serving on a little committee established by Bob
Miller, who was then the MORS sponsor at the
Office of Naval Research. On the committee
were also Erv Kapos, Captain Frank Andrews,
and perhaps another analyst or two. I became
known as someone interested in Operations
Analysis in the fleet. It might have been Erv
Kapos who asked me to take the Naval Warfare
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Working Group, but I don’t know who to thank
for sure. At the 28th, Ken Bohlin (whom I
worked with on the Cyclops Study) had Under-
sea Warfare, Dick Lester had Land Warfare,
and Jack Walker had Ethics and Standards (at
which Jack Borsting, then NPS Chairman, Colo-
nel Neil Downey from USMA, Clay Thomas,
and Bob Stevens of Cornell Labs, Buffalo at-
tended).
I’m still proud of my lineup of classy
speakers in the Naval Warfare Working Group.
They included Bernie Koopman, Sid Shear from
CNA, John Kettelle of Ketron, Ernie Holmboe
of ORI, Inc. on High Speed Ships, Mike Sover-
eign of NPS, Lieutenant Commander Dave
Clark, later Captain, of OP-96, Commander
Rich Handford of COMASWFORLANT staff on
SSNs in an escort role, and not least Captain
Staser Holcomb on the tests at sea of the then-
new CV concept. Staser’s presence was espe-
cially remarkable because he was at the time
the executive officer of the carrier SARATOGA.
BOB SHELDON: I want to ask about your
transition to NPS. Did you choose to go back
because it was a great place to live or for the
academics?
WAYNE HUGHES: I ought to first step
back and describe my tour in the Under Secre-
tary of the Navy’s office. It was part and parcel
of that decision. From Deputy Director of
OP-96 I went to a big Training Command in
Pensacola, Florida. I was there for two years
when I got interviewed for Executive Assistant
to the Under Secretary of the Navy, Jim Wool-
sey. This was the same Jim Woolsey who was
later the Director of Central Intelligence. Young
and energetic with an analytical background,
he wanted an Executive Assistant (EA) who
understood analysis. Personally, I think he had
his mind made up before I even went back for
the interview. Another analyst interviewed to
be the Secretary of the Navy’s Executive Assis-
tant was Skid Masterson. Skid and I had
worked on the Major Fleet Escort Study to-
gether. Skid had had a tour in OPA and was
remarkable in his own right. In any event, I
became Jim Woolsey’s EA for two years. I must
tell you one other great story with all kinds of
lessons associated with it. While Woolsey was
the Under Secretary there was a big hurrah in
the Congress over whether the next carrier
should be nuclear powered or conventionally
powered. The House Armed Service Commit-
tee had one view and the Senate had another
and since they couldn’t resolve the issue, they
decided to do what they always do under such
circumstances, which was to commission a
study. The time allotted for the study was six
months. The study came down to the Secretary
of Defense and he passed it to Secretary of the
Navy Graham Claytor who told Woolsey: “I
want you to honcho this personally and care-
fully.” Claytor passed the study to Tom Hay-
ward, the CNO, who was hard over for a CVN
(Carrier Vessel Nuclear). Secretary Claytor was
strongly in favor of a conventionally powered
carrier although he knew that the Navy should
have a big voice in the final decision. Both
Claytor and Woolsey knew the Navy leader-
ship favored a CVN and they certainly didn’t
want to be blindsided by some kind of biased,
pre-ordained result. So the agreement was that
it would go to OP-96. OP-96 at that time was
directed by Rear Admiral Carl Trost, later Chief
of Naval Operations. A brilliant man, he be-
came the virtual study director, and spent a lot
of time with the team that actually did the work
at the Center of Naval Analyses. A key partic-
ipant in the study was Bruce Powers. I’ve
talked to Bruce and he essentially confirms
what I’m about to tell you about the way the
study was done. Which was, let me tell you, an
act of genius. The study was done in a rush, in
about three months, which means that they
really had to move on it quickly, yet take a
comprehensive look at the many issues in-
volved. And they proceeded in the following
way, and I’m talking about a lot of analysis
with realistic scenarios and analytical “attacks”
by Soviet submarines and aircraft. And also the
carrier’s role in non-Soviet situations like a war
in Korea.
When the study was done, there were not
two but three finalists. There was a CVN of
ninety thousand tons, a NIMITZ class in effect.
There was an equally large conventionally
powered carrier, the characteristics of which
only differed in the propulsion plant. And there
was a small carrier of about thirty-five thou-
sand tons. But the aircraft flying off the small
carrier would be a STOVL, a short take-off,
vertical landing aircraft.
The study report came into my office, the
outer office of Jim Woolsey, copy number one.
And I immediately took it in without looking at
it and gave it to the Under Secretary. Within
half an hour a known proponent of the little
carrier and STOVL aircraft came running into
my office, it was Rear Admiral Doug Mow,
waving the study, saying: “Look Wayne, this
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study proves that the STOVL aircraft flying off
the little carrier is the only way to go.” Well, if
Doug Mow says that, then it must be true, but
how can that possibly be the outcome of a
study when it is well-known that Admiral Hay-
ward favors a CVN? So while I’m pondering
that, somebody else came running into my of-
fice waving this study saying: “Look Wayne,
the study proves that a CVN is the only way to
go.” WOW! Thirty minutes later another guy
came in waving the study saying: “Look
Wayne, the non-nuclear powered CV is the
clear winner. The study proves it.” Well, not
long after that I got my hands on the study
myself, borrowed back from the Under Secre-
tary. And I said: “Oh, now I see.” The study
had seven different scenarios. At least two sce-
narios favored each of the candidates. Not only
was this the politically astute answer to a Con-
gressional inquiry—otherwise you cannot
make everyone happy—but it was also literally
true. If there was a clear-cut winner, we
would’ve known this twenty years earlier be-
cause this has been a controversial subject out-
side the Navy since the 1960’s. It’s literally true
that the preferred carrier design depends upon
what war you think you’re going to fight, and
you can find a number of situations that would
favor any particular answer.
Yet I also thought that the study, when
probed more deeply, made a compelling case
for the CVN. To make a long story short, the
reason is because the cost of the carrier itself is
not the driving cost of the system. The system is
the cost of the carrier and the aircraft on it. So
you can have a twenty-five percent premium
on the cost of the nuclear power carrier, which
is substantially more expensive than the con-
ventionally powered carrier. But if you put the
aircraft on it, the aircraft costs as much or more
than the carrier. The carrier is probably going to
last for fifty years and has two generations of
aircraft flying off it in those fifty years. So you
doggone well want to include the operating
cost of both the carrier and the aircraft. The
operating cost of a CV and a CVN is just about
a wash, since the carriers are by assumption the
same, except for the propulsion plant. The op-
erating cost of an aircraft is annually something
like ten percent of the procurement cost of an
aircraft. With a ship it’s more like four percent
of the cost of construction. Sometime around
the twentieth year you’re going to want to buy
a new generation aircraft to fly off of it. The
new generation aircraft is going to cost at least
as much as the first generation aircraft and
probably more. In other words, I’m painting a
picture where the operating cost of the ship and
the aircraft and the procurement of the aircraft
that are going to fly off the aircraft carrier
clearly dominate the ship procurement cost. So
the premium that you pay, twenty-five percent
extra for the cost of the nuclear powered carrier
to begin with, even though it’s very big bucks,
is dominated by the cost of the aircraft and the
operating costs. The conclusion is that the pre-
mium that you have to pay for a nuclear power
plant is small potatoes compared to overall
cost, yet there are many situations in which the
CVN has an advantage over the CV in an op-
erating environment. Especially when it’s not
subject to attack. Be that as it may, the sea-
based air platform study I thought was one of
the great studies of all time by telling the Con-
gress: “Look, the decision really depends upon
how you think the carrier’s going to be em-
ployed and what the next war is going to look
like.” That’s a judgment call, and the judgment
ought to be that of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. The Secretary of the Navy and the Secre-
tary of Defense (who also favored a CV over a
CVN) bowed to Admiral Hayward and the re-
sult was the next year a CVN was authorized
and appropriated for. To answer the question
that started this story, after two years in Jim
Woolsey’s office, I said: “I think it’s time for me
to make a transition.” And he supported me.
NOTE. The interview was paused at this
point and resumes with Wayne Hughes, Dr.
Bob Sheldon, and a list of questions about
teaching, book writing, and views on analysis.
BOB SHELDON: It is the 11th of June and
we have resumed our interview with Wayne
Hughes at the Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps
Research Center, United States Marine Corps
Base, Quantico, Virginia. Wayne, please tell us
how you got the job at NPS?
WAYNE HUGHES: After two years with
Jim Woolsey, the Under Secretary, I decided it
was time to make a career shift and was think-
ing of retiring. I had an offer then to go to
Newport to the Naval War College or to the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. In
fact, the Superintendent Tyler Dedman, Jack
Borsting, the Provost, and Mike Sovereign, who
was the Chairman of the Department, all wan-
dered into my office and said, “Wayne, you
really ought to come to Monterey. That’s the
best place for you.” So I went home and I asked
my wife Joan what she wanted to do, because I
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said that we’d made twenty-two moves in a
thirty-year career and she had never been given
a choice so now she got to choose. Happily, she
decided that Monterey was the best place.
BOB SHELDON:How did you like being a
professor?
WAYNE HUGHES: I never really suc-
ceeded in simply being an Operations Research
professor. Most of my teaching has been pretty
much military operations related. I taught
Navy Operations Analysis, as an introductory
course and also a capstone course in campaign
analysis. I taught another capstone course in
Joint C3 Operations, and a course in applied
EW (electronic warfare), not in the OR Depart-
ment, but elsewhere on campus. I did a lot of
unusual and off the beaten path kinds of things.
I was in a Chair called Applied Systems
Analysis for the first couple of years. And then
I was the first Chairman in the newly created
Chair of Tactical Analysis. This second position
was created because we were trying to be more
responsive to the Chief of Naval Operations.
One of the Chief’s goals was to revitalize the
tactical competency of the Navy. The CNO was
Admiral Tom Hayward. He sent a Rear Admi-
ral to NPS named “Boot” Hill who asked what
the school could do to enhance tactics. We said,
“Well, we could create a tactical analysis cur-
riculum—an entire curriculum devoted to the
subject. Or, we could adjust a few courses in the
OA curriculum if you send us a good, smart
Navy captain tactician. We know where we
could put them into the core curriculum for
Ops Analysis. They will add emphasis on the
fleet side and a better balance against the Wash-
ington decision making side, the systems anal-
ysis side.” That seemed like a good thing to do
regardless of the initiatives of the CNO. I
thought this was something that was overdue
anyway. When the Navy couldn’t find anyone
to sit in our new Chair of Tactical Analysis on
short notice, I shifted from the Applied Systems
Analysis Chair to the Tactical Analysis Chair.
So I was the second holder of the Applied Sys-
tems Analysis Chair after Pat Parker, and the
first holder of the Chair at Tactical Analysis.
BOB SHELDON: What year was that?
WAYNE HUGHES: I went out in 1979. I
shifted to the Chair of Tactical Analysis in 1982.
As soon as the Navy found somebody who was
right for the position, I retired and became one
of the civilian faculty in 1983.
BOB SHELDON: What did you put into
your courses, and how did you incorporate
your operational experiences?
WAYNE HUGHES: My value, my unique-
ness at NPS, came from having had more op-
erations experience. I had thought a lot about
the tactics of combat, and especially about anti-
submarine warfare. I became pretty proficient
in warfare analysis. It was about this time I
started thinking about writing a book on fleet
tactics. I should also tell you that in my very
first class I taught Pat Tracey who was then a
Lieutenant Commander and is now a Vice Ad-
miral. Pat took the tactics course, and shortly
after that she asked me to be her thesis advisor.
She was a self-starter and a hard working and
perceptive student. A wise lady is the best way
to describe her even then.
BOB SHELDON: What was her thesis
topic?
WAYNE HUGHES: It was a cute thing. She
had used a hand held programmable calcula-
tor, an old TI 59 hand held computer. She built
a program in it that would compute the prob-
ability of hit of a spread of missiles. You could
fire one, two, three or four harpoons at an en-
emy target using an error probability associ-
ated with the location, target location, and the
distribution of the missiles from where you
thought you were aiming them. She just
worked out the math for the swept path prob-
abilities against an area of uncertainty for the
target and the algorithm would calculate the
probability of one or more hits.
BOB SHELDON: Any other notable stu-
dents?
WAYNE HUGHES: I’m proud to claim the
Vice Chief, Admiral Mike Mullin as my thesis
student. He did a thesis on AEGIS cruiser tac-
tics. He wanted to write something practical
that he knew something about, and did. I think
he understood the power and limitations of
Operations Analysis better than most gradu-
ates, which is saying a lot.
BOB SHELDON: Since you’re at a gradu-
ate school, were you ever under any pressure
academically that you should get a Ph.D. or
Doctoral degree?
WAYNE HUGHES: When I decided I
wanted to stay in education, I said, “I’ll need a
Ph.D.” Mike Sovereign formed a little commit-
tee with himself as a member and Al Washburn
was on it and a few other notables at the school.
They came back in a day or two and said:
“Wayne, we don’t think you ought to take the
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time to get a Ph.D. To be a tenured professor,
then all during the tenure process (that’s six
years) you’ll have to behave like everybody
else. The reason we like you is because you’re
different and unique. And we’d rather you kept
on doing what you’re doing.” I said: “That’s
okay by me. Anytime the Navy says I’m not
pulling my weight I’ll be more than happy to
leave.”
BOB SHELDON:When did you start writ-
ing your numerous books and articles?
WAYNE HUGHES: The order of the books
was first Military Modeling and then Fleet Tac-
tics. If I remember correctly, Charlie Woods
was the President of the Military Operations
Research Society. He called me up and said:
“The Board feels like we need some book on
VV&A, verification, validation, and accredita-
tion,” although I think then it was just called V
& V in those pre-accreditation days. So I
thought about it. Charlie was my mentor in the
Pentagon, my first Pentagon boss, an old hand
at analysis. He taught me a lot about how to be
an action officer in the Pentagon. We were good
friends. I called him back and said: “Charlie,
what you do about validation and verification
depends upon what kind of models you’re talk-
ing about.” They tend to be different depending
upon whether they have to do with systems
analysis and procurement, fleet operations
analysis, force level analysis, training models,
logistic models and even strategic deterrent
models. This applies to the non-Navy or non-
military type models (e.g., the State Depart-
ment) as well. So I said: “I don’t think there’s
any point in writing anything on VV&A until
we covered the nature of military models and
what they’re good for.” So he said: “Okay.” I
said, “I want to organize a committee and I
want the committee to be prepared to write the
individual chapters. The first thing I’ll do is
write an overview for the book which will serve
as the glue and the common bond that guides
each of the individual authors. The overview
will have no name attributed to it. That’ll be a
collective effort but I’ll write the draft and then
everybody else can weigh in and we’ll work out
the common things and the individual things
that mark these different kinds of military mod-
els.” So I sweated out the draft for a while.
There is a connection with Fleet Tactics, because
I’m thinking about writing Fleet Tactics and, in
fact, I’ll come back and talk more about that,
because they overlapped in principle.
BOB SHELDON: So things were off to a
good start?
WAYNE HUGHES: Yes and no. When I
had a decent draft written that I was very
proud of, I sent it out to everybody on the
committee and to Walt Hollis and Clay Thomas
and other people whom I respected and who
ought to read it anyway. They tore it up pretty
badly. That slowed me down about six months,
and as I rewrote it, I rethought a lot of things
that I thought I had right and decided I didn’t.
Meanwhile I met with the committee members
insofar as possible, people like Bob Hallex for
the Navy, Jim Martin for Strategic Operations,
and Colonel John Friel for the Air Force side.
Steve Drezner and Bob Hillestead did logistics,
Bernie Rostker drafted the chapter on human
resources. It was hard to get them all together
but I would meet them on and off, and they
would read my latest overview and vent on me
about it. We just proceeded and pretty soon we
had it all assembled and then the MORS office
took over and was the publisher of choice. By
this time I was back on the MORS Board and
enjoying myself. We did, in the end, say some
useful things about verification, validation and
accreditation. The book helped serve as a foun-
dation for intelligent comments on what you
can and can’t expect to do with verification and
validation. V&V is hard to do, as you well
know, and everybody who’s been in our busi-
ness knows this.
As I said, I was in mid-passage thinking
about this and was teaching all this time. We
were getting into tactics in the classroom and
I’d been looking for a book that contained any-
thing on modern tactics. I found one by an
Italian named Fiaravanzo, a retired admiral. It
had been translated into English and published
by the Naval Institute Press in the 1950s. But
there was nothing, literally nothing that I could
find by an American since 1941. So I called my
friend Hugh Nott at the Naval War College and
said: “Have I overlooked something?” He said:
“I don’t think so, but I’ll check.” He called back
a few days later and said: “I don’t think there’s
been a book by an American author in fifty
years.” Rear Admiral SS Robison published a
book that stopped in 1931 but was republished
in 1941. I said, “Well, why don’t we write one?”
And he said: “Good idea, but I’ve got two
books of fiction to finish first.” And I said:
“That’s good because I have this book on Mil-
itary Modeling to finish.” We outlined Fleet Tac-
tics and sent it to the Naval Institute Press. The
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Naval Institute Press came back with a signed
contract.
BOB SHELDON: How did Fleet Tactics go?
WAYNE HUGHES: The date for which we
were supposed to deliver a manuscript we
failed to meet, but that was for two reasons.
One was we were doing this stuff on the side.
The other is that as we were starting to get
serious and putting pen to paper, Hugh had
several strokes and died. I had been counting
on Hugh to do a lot of writing on modern
tactics and I found myself confronted with the
fact that I had nothing after the battleship era.
There were lots of books on what tactics were,
how they worked, how ships fought under oar,
under sail, and under steam, but starting about
1950 there came this big vacuum. Even for
World War II there wasn’t any theoretical basis.
Everything we had could describe the way we
fought as history, but there wasn’t any under-
lying, unifying scheme to think about modern
tactics. I had been counting on Hugh Nott do-
ing that because he was the Director of Naval
Warfare Studies at the War College and it was
his job to be current. Without Hugh, I was now
stuck with doing it myself. But I am proud of
the fact that I did a lot of original thinking.
BOB SHELDON: How did you lay out the
book?
WAYNE HUGHES: Well, I first mapped
out what I thought were the “essential dynam-
ics,” that is to say the dynamic processes of
naval combat. I have a nice little speech, too
long for this discussion, that lays out the things
that are involved in naval combat. They are a
lot easier described for naval combat than for
land combat, because naval combat is so much
cleaner and easier to understand in principle.
That doesn’t mean naval combat isn’t suffi-
ciently challenging. Knowing that there are
twelve variables involved in naval combat of
which you only control six requires some sort-
ing out both analytically and operationally. If
you have to understand the twelve vital vari-
ables and apply them (either to do a study or to
fight and win the battle) you realize they are
sufficiently challenging for anybody. One more
thing and then I’ll quit on the Fleet Tactics book.
I kind of pooh-poohed the principles of war
and said: “Look, after you go to a great effort to
establish the great principles, then you kind of
say—well, so what?” Many of the principles are
self-evident, like the principle of concentration
of force. It is something that two six-year olds
discover on the playground early in life. Some
of the principles are internally self-contradic-
tory or in tension with each other. The mutual
tension shows up in the principles of the of-
fense conflicting with the principle of securi-
ty—they are not mutually exclusive but cer-
tainly being bold and cautious at the same time
is something I highlight. Besides if you want to
understand how to fight then you ought to be
able to describe the way the battle goes in a
dynamic fashion, which means developing a
combat model. That’s what my operations anal-
ysis experience brought to my thinking about
the book. At the outset, I said in the book that
it’s a blend of operational background, from a
guy who had two sea commands and thought
an awful lot about battle, even though he never
fought one. Operations Analysis was critical in
looking at the subject rigorously, and a histor-
ical perspective was needed to put trends and
constants in context. All three (operations, op-
erations analysis, and history) are not every-
thing, but they fit my personality and back-
ground to write the book. I think we signed the
contract in 1983. The book was finally pub-
lished in 1986.
BOB SHELDON: There have been revi-
sions or updates to both of those books. What
motivated those?
WAYNE HUGHES: The first book was in-
troduced with the cornerstones of naval combat
by describing the first battle of the Nile, that is,
Nelson’s great victory in 1798. Then I went
through the whole length of the book and de-
scribed what I thought was the evolution of
naval tactics, how to understand tactics, and
the dynamics of a battle. I ended the first edi-
tion with an imaginary battle in 1998 between a
Soviet fleet and an American fleet and I called it
the Second Battle of the Nile. That was very
effective, but in 1990–1991 the Soviet Union
collapsed. We had now passed the year 1998
and happily this battle never happened nor
could it ever happen. I figured I needed a new
conclusion. In addition, the theme of the second
edition of Fleet Tactics was much more closely
aligned with coastal combat and inshore oper-
ations. So I created a totally new second battle
in the Aegean in which the Greeks and the
Turks and the Americans were all involved in a
confrontation that leads to a hot war. This was
the way I modernized the incident to illustrate
inshore tactics. It was a major reason that I
decided that I needed to update the book. The
Soviet Union had collapsed and our tactical
emphasis had changed from blue water to
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green coastal water. I’d gone overseas and
worked on a project for three months in Lon-
don. While I was there I dreamed up the sce-
nario and vetted it with the intelligence officers
there. Of course there is a long history of fric-
tion that has existed between Greece and Tur-
key. That led to an imaginary battle to illustrate
littoral combat in the missile age.
BOB SHELDON: You incorporate a lot of
historical examples or analogies into your writ-
ings. Do you have a favorite period in history
you like to study?
WAYNE HUGHES: I think my very favor-
ite is the night battles in the Solomons. For the
first six months we kept losing and didn’t know
why. But through sheer grit we managed to
hang on to Guadalcanal. The Japanese were
losing a lot of aircraft and some ships and we
were losing a lot of ships and some aircraft. The
IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) finally realized
that they couldn’t sustain Guadalcanal and
withdrew. Then there was a pause and Com-
mander Arleigh Burke came out, later CNO
Admiral Arleigh Burke. He was in destroyers
and he worked for a fellow named Tip Merrill
who had the cruisers. They had time to think
about what they’d been doing wrong and they
worked out a new set of tactics. This captured
my imagination in 1951 when I was a midship-
man. Arleigh Burke, according to EB Potter,
had attributed his tactical plan to having read
the Battle of Zama in which Scipio Africanus
defeated Hannibal. It turns out that the story
was somewhat exaggerated, but it sure got this
young midshipman’s juices flowing. I’ve been a
fan of Arleigh Burke ever since and I do think
that he was our greatest wartime surface tacti-
cian and the greatest CNO since World War II.
BOB SHELDON: You maintain a lot of
contacts with foreign students that come to
NPS, as well as students across the other Ser-
vices. What is your opinion about the quality of
their Operations Research, their studies at NPS
and follow-on Operations Research work?
WAYNE HUGHES: The old rule of quality
in, quality out applies. Some of the foreign na-
tions were sending us people who might’ve
been here more as political appointees and
were not all that good. But in the last ten years
it seems to me that the students have been very
capable. The Singaporeans have been very im-
pressive. I don’t get them as thesis students
very often because they usually want to do
something that is less tactically oriented and
more in electronics, systems engineering, C2, or
logistics. But I know a lot of them and I admire
a lot of them. In 1987 I was in Singapore for six
months to help get their Operations Analysis
program going by working with some of their
new recent graduates in Singapore proper. I
have the highest regard for their analytical
skills and thinking.
The students I’ve worked with the most
have been a series of Greek and Turkish stu-
dents and that’s kind of funny because of ri-
valry between the Mediterranean students.
Starting with the Greeks, they had been reading
Fleet Tactics and they were interested in the
models that I developed. They extended the
salvo equations for thesis work in a variety of
ways. A series of three or four Greeks sort of
handed me off from one student to the next.
When the Turks found out about that, they
couldn’t stand the thought of the Greeks steal-
ing a march on them. So I started to get a series
of very good Turkish students too. We all did a
lot of good thinking and expanding, develop-
ing, and extending the models. We all got a
better understanding of the combat models this
way.
BOB SHELDON: Do you have a leaning
towards any of the academic areas of OR?
WAYNE HUGHES: Well, here’s another
dichotomy. I’ve generally said that the value of
optimization has been oversold. But on the
other hand my own thesis was an optimization
solution. So it isn’t as if I think this technique
does not have value.
BOB SHELDON: Of the people who pre-
ceded you in the OR field, like the OEG folks,
are there any of the early founders of military
OR that you had close personal contacts with?
WAYNE HUGHES: No question about it,
my very favorite, because I read Search and
Screening long before I ever expected to meet
the author, BO Koopman, Bernie Koopman. I
invited him to be in my first MORS working
group. He accepted, came, read a nifty little
paper and we kind of hit it off right there. So
when he was revising his Search and Screening
not long before he died, he asked me if I’d read
the manuscript. I said: “I don’t know what I can
do with the math.” He said: “I don’t want you
to read it for the math. I want you to read it for
its relevance.” We did update the operational
context for modern ASW (in the 1970’s) since it
had shifted in many ways. Towed arrays were
important for screening and choke point search.
The importance of aircraft, not only searching
but also attacking submerged submarines, ex-
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ceeded what was possible when he wrote the
first edition in 1946. Of all the people I think
Bernie Koopman is my favorite and most ad-
mired. Second to him would be Dan Wagner of
Wagner Associates. Dan had latched onto me
when I was at ASWFORLANT. He was a pre-
mier marketer, but he assembled the highest
quality of mathematical analysts ever known
and delivered quality work without fail. Dan
Wagner’s “children” are all over our commu-
nity right now. Anything that has to do with
better search techniques, there’s a strong possi-
bility that people like Larry Stone, Tony Rich-
ardson, and Bernie McCabe had a hand in. Dan
Wagner was not himself as intellectually or
analytically powerful as Koopman, but he may
have had an equally great effect because he
carefully selected the people he hired. He de-
manded high quality work. When they went off
on their own, they were Wagner-trained men.
BOB SHELDON: A closing question. You
touch a lot of students personally and impact
them and guide them in their careers. Could
you give similar guidance to some of the young
analysts who don’t have a chance to encounter
you in the classroom at NPS?
WAYNE HUGHES: The single most im-
portant thing to remember is to be customer
related in your work. You get prone to become
overly charmed with your ownmodel building.
There’s a lot of money in model building, but
that really isn’t analysis. The models ought to
be developed with a particular purpose in
mind. I have great skepticism about what in
Military Modeling I called all-purpose models,
which “always fail.” If you keep in mind that
there is a specific customer and a specific prob-
lem, it’s okay to develop some theory on the
side, like Koopman did. It was a conscious
decision by Philip Morse to turn Koopman
loose to synthesize a lot of practical things that
now are the foundation of search, screening,
and detection theory. To achieve great value in
our practice, you have to work out a relation-
ship with the customer—somebody you can
help. If a tactical commander won’t let you help
him, there’s not much you can do and you
might as well help somebody else. But if you
establish a bond and he trusts you and you
trust that he will respect your work as honest
and objective, then that’s about as good as it
gets. The only thing I can think of that’s better
is being married or having command of a ship.
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